Smaller provinces may improve administrative access, but without meaningful political, financial and administrative devolution, Pakistan risks creating more centres of power rather than bringing government closer to citizens
Pakistan’s governance crisis is becoming increasingly difficult to ignore. A country of nearly 250 million people is being administered through structures that often appear too centralised, too distant and too slow to respond to the everyday needs of citizens.
This has revived an important national debate: should Pakistan create new provinces and smaller administrative units to improve governance?
The question deserves serious consideration. But before boundaries are redrawn, another question must be answered. Will new provinces actually decentralise power, or will they simply reproduce the same governance problems within smaller geographical areas?
The argument for smaller provinces has considerable merit. Provinces with populations running into tens of millions can themselves become highly centralised systems. Political authority, financial resources and administrative decision making often remain concentrated in provincial capitals, leaving remote districts with limited influence over decisions that directly affect them.
Smaller administrative units could reduce the distance between citizens and government. They could allow regional priorities to receive greater attention, make public institutions more responsive and provide communities that feel politically neglected with a stronger voice.
South Punjab has long been at the centre of demands for a separate province. Islamabad could also be considered within a wider debate over administrative restructuring, while other proposals may deserve examination on the basis of population, geography, economic viability and administrative efficiency.
But creating a province is far more complicated than drawing new lines on a map.
Any alteration in the federal structure would involve constitutional procedures, political consensus and, where provincial boundaries are affected, approval by the relevant provincial legislature. New provincial governments would require assemblies, cabinets, secretariats, administrative departments and bureaucratic structures.
There would also be significant financial consequences.
Each new province would require a share of national resources. Revenue distribution arrangements would have to be reconsidered, while questions involving assets, liabilities, government employees, public institutions and development responsibilities would need to be resolved.
Before Pakistan moves towards such a major restructuring, policymakers should therefore present credible estimates of the costs involved and measurable evidence of the governance benefits expected from the change.
There is an even more fundamental issue.
If the political and administrative culture remains unchanged, smaller provinces could simply become smaller versions of the existing system. Power may shift from one provincial capital to several new provincial capitals without ever reaching districts, towns and neighbourhoods.
New bureaucracies could reproduce old bureaucratic weaknesses. New political elites could control resources in much the same way as existing ones. Citizens could still remain dependent on distant offices for decisions concerning local services.
This is why the debate over new provinces cannot be separated from the debate over local government.
Pakistan already has a constitutional and administrative mechanism capable of bringing government significantly closer to citizens: empowered local governments.
Municipalities, districts and local councils deal with many of the services that shape daily life, including local roads, sanitation, water supply, land use, municipal regulation, public spaces and community infrastructure. Yet local government remains one of the weakest parts of Pakistan’s democratic structure.
Provincial governments have historically shown limited willingness to transfer meaningful political, administrative and financial authority to elected local institutions.
This creates an obvious contradiction.
Political parties strongly defend provincial autonomy when powers and resources are being transferred from Islamabad to the provinces. Yet the same principle becomes far less attractive when provincial capitals are asked to transfer authority and money to districts, cities and neighbourhoods.
The reason is partly political.
An empowered local government system distributes control over development funds, public services and administrative decisions. It places resources closer to voters and reduces the dependence of communities on provincial legislators and party leadership structures.
Those who currently exercise these powers therefore have little political incentive to surrender them.
This does not mean that Pakistan should reject the idea of new provinces. Demographic growth, regional inequalities and administrative pressures may eventually make additional provinces necessary.
The debate may, in fact, already be overdue.
But any serious proposal must go beyond slogans. It should identify the proposed boundaries, explain the constitutional process, calculate the financial cost, assess the economic viability of each new unit and demonstrate how public services would improve.
Most importantly, any restructuring plan should explain how authority will continue moving downward after a new province is created.
Pakistan may indeed need a different administrative map. But changing the map alone will not repair governance.
The real test of reform is not how many provinces appear on the map. It is how close political authority, public money and decision making ultimately move towards the citizen.
If new provinces merely create additional capitals where power remains concentrated, Pakistan will have reorganised centralisation rather than eliminated it.
A meaningful reform would do something more ambitious: redraw not only administrative boundaries, but also the relationship between the state and the citizen.

The $314.93 million Sindh Barrages Improvement Project has made substantial progress on physical rehabilitation and modernisation works at Guddu and Sukkur barrages. Yet the World Bank has downgraded the project’s development objective and implementation progress ratings from “Satisfactory” to “Moderately Satisfactory”, while retaining the overall risk rating at “Substantial”.
At first glance, the downgrade appears difficult to reconcile with the project’s physical achievements. By July 2026, around 84% of rehabilitation and modernisation works at the two barrages had been completed, while the disbursement rate had reached 82.25%. The replacement of the main gates at Sukkur Barrage has been completed, and significant rehabilitation work has also been carried out at Guddu.
The World Bank’s concern, however, is not primarily about the concrete, gates or structures. It is about whether the institutions responsible for operating and maintaining this critical infrastructure are developing quickly enough to protect the investment over the long term.
This distinction reflects a recurring weakness in major development projects in Pakistan. Construction progress is relatively easy to measure. The number of gates replaced, contracts awarded, funds disbursed and physical works completed can all be recorded and reported. Building institutions capable of managing the same infrastructure effectively for decades is considerably more difficult. It requires trained staff, clear responsibilities, accountability, reliable maintenance systems and sustained administrative and political attention.
The Sindh Barrages project illustrates this gap clearly. The operations and maintenance performance score improved only marginally, from 40 in December 2025 to 44 in July 2026, against a target of 90 by June 2028. The figures suggest that institutional and operational improvements are moving far more slowly than the physical rehabilitation works.
Progress on the calibration of canal head regulators has also been slow. The Barrage Management Unit has yet to award a performance based maintenance contract, while the World Bank has pointed to limited progress in establishing a standard methodology for sediment monitoring.
These may appear to be secondary technical matters compared with the replacement of major barrage gates, but they are central to the long term value of the investment. A modernised barrage cannot deliver its intended benefits if its equipment is not properly maintained, water control systems are not accurately calibrated, or sediment and flood risks are not incorporated into routine management decisions.
This is why the World Bank has warned that slow institutional reforms could pose a risk to the sustainability of the investment. The issue is particularly important because Guddu and Sukkur are not isolated infrastructure projects. They are central components of Sindh’s irrigation system and directly influence water management, agriculture and the economic activity of millions of people.
Their importance is expected to increase as Pakistan faces growing climate-related risks, including more severe floods and changing water patterns. One of the project’s major objectives is to increase the flood passage capacity of Guddu and Sukkur barrages from 900,000 cusecs to 1.2 million cusecs. Climate resilient infrastructure under the project is expected to benefit around five million people.
A failure to maintain these systems effectively would therefore have consequences far beyond the project’s balance sheet. Weak operations, delayed maintenance or inadequate emergency preparedness could eventually undermine the benefits of the substantial investment being made today.
There has nevertheless been meaningful progress. The replacement of Sukkur Barrage’s main gates has been completed, major rehabilitation works have advanced at Guddu, and technical studies for long term flood and sediment management at Sukkur have been completed. Emergency preparedness plans for three barrages have also been prepared and reviewed.
The challenge now is to translate these studies and plans into functioning institutional systems. Flood and sediment management recommendations need to be implemented, emergency plans must be effectively communicated among barrage authorities and local administrations, maintenance arrangements need to be finalised, and operations and maintenance performance must move toward the target of 90.
The World Bank’s downgrade should therefore be viewed less as a final verdict and more as an early warning. With the revised completion date extending to June 2028, there is still time to correct the institutional weaknesses. But the remaining period cannot be focused exclusively on completing physical works.
The Sindh government and relevant agencies will need to demonstrate measurable progress in operations, maintenance, regulator calibration, performance based maintenance arrangements and emergency preparedness alongside construction achievements.
Ultimately, the success of the Sindh Barrages Improvement Project will not be determined simply by how many gates are replaced or how much money is spent. The real test will begin after contractors leave the site. The infrastructure will only remain a successful long term investment if the institutions responsible for operating and maintaining it are strong enough to preserve its value for decades to come.

The Hague arbitration findings reinforce the treaty’s legal status and underline the importance of international agreements in managing water disputes between Pakistan and India
The Indus Waters Treaty is far more than an agreement dividing river waters between Pakistan and India. It is one of the most important international legal frameworks governing relations between two long-standing rivals. Despite wars, political crises and decades of tensions, the treaty survived for generations. That history makes the latest legal findings by the Permanent Court of Arbitration in The Hague particularly significant for Pakistan and for the wider principle of international treaty law.
At the heart of the dispute is a fundamental question: can a country unilaterally suspend or disregard an international agreement because of political or security-related grievances? The arbitration findings provide important clarification on this issue by maintaining that the Indus Waters Treaty remains legally operative and that the obligations created under it continue to apply. This includes obligations concerning the design and operation of Indian hydropower projects on the western rivers.
Pakistan has consistently argued that disputes over the Indus, Jhelum and Chenab rivers should be addressed through the mechanisms established by the treaty rather than through political pressure or unilateral action. That principle is central to the treaty itself. It created a rules-based system under which disagreements could be addressed through bilateral mechanisms, a neutral expert or arbitration, depending on the nature of the dispute.
For Pakistan, the issue has enormous economic and social importance. The country’s agriculture, food security, hydropower generation and the livelihoods of millions of people are closely linked to the Indus River system. Any serious disruption to the availability or management of these waters could therefore have consequences far beyond diplomacy. It could affect agricultural production, energy supplies and economic stability.
The legal findings are also important because they challenge several arguments that could otherwise be used to justify suspending the treaty. The court’s conclusions indicate that Pakistan’s alleged failure to agree to amendments did not amount to a material breach that would terminate its obligations. The findings also indicate that allegations related to terrorism cannot, by themselves, provide a legal basis for suspending a treaty that specifically establishes rights and obligations concerning the waters of the Indus system.
The dispute surrounding the Ratle hydropower project adds another important dimension. Pakistan has raised concerns for years about the design and operation of Indian projects on the western rivers. Interim measures in the arbitration process are significant because they seek to prevent irreversible developments from affecting the dispute before the relevant legal process reaches its conclusion. In water disputes, the consequences of construction decisions can extend far into the future, making such safeguards particularly important.
At the same time, the legal findings should not be viewed as the final solution to the broader Pakistan India water dispute. Courts and arbitration bodies can clarify legal obligations, but they cannot replace diplomacy or day to day institutional cooperation. A treaty can provide the rules, but those rules ultimately require communication and mechanisms through which both sides can address technical and operational concerns.
India’s rejection of the Permanent Court of Arbitration’s jurisdiction adds another layer of complexity. However, disagreement with an international legal process does not automatically eliminate the principles governing international agreements. If states were free to accept treaty obligations when convenient and disregard them whenever political circumstances changed, the reliability of international agreements would be seriously weakened.
The history of the Indus Waters Treaty demonstrates why rules-based agreements matter. Pakistan and India have remained deeply divided on numerous political and security issues, yet the water framework continued to provide a mechanism for managing one of their most sensitive shared resources. That resilience is itself an important lesson for international diplomacy.
For Pakistan, the next step should therefore involve a combination of legal preparedness, close monitoring of developments on the western rivers and efforts to restore meaningful institutional engagement under the treaty. A strong legal position is important, but long-term water security also requires technical cooperation and sustained diplomacy.
The broader lesson extends beyond South Asia. Water is increasingly becoming a strategic resource in a world facing population growth, climate change and growing pressure on freshwater supplies. The Indus Waters Treaty shows that even countries with deeply hostile relations can create rules for managing shared natural resources. Its future should therefore be shaped by law, responsibility and dialogue rather than by unilateral political pressure.
Ultimately, the significance of the arbitration findings lies not only in their immediate implications for Pakistan and India but also in the wider principle they reinforce: international agreements derive their value from the stability of their obligations. If the Indus Waters Treaty is to continue serving its purpose, both countries must preserve the rules based framework that has helped manage their shared rivers for decades.

Pakistan’s power sector is facing a striking contradiction. On one side, hydropower generation has crossed 7,000 MW during the monsoon as higher river flows have improved water availability. On the other, Punjab is reportedly facing a power shortfall of up to 4,000 MW, with load shedding increasing in several areas. The central question is simple: if Pakistan has access to large amounts of relatively low cost hydropower, why does the country continue to depend so heavily on thermal generation?
Pakistan has an installed power generation capacity of around 49,651 MW. However, installed capacity does not mean that the same amount of electricity is available to the national grid at all times. Actual generation depends on fuel availability, water levels, plant performance, transmission capacity and the financial health of the power sector.
The reported shortfall in Punjab highlights this gap between installed capacity and actual generation. Shortages of gas and oil have reportedly forced several power plants to operate below capacity, reducing electricity available to the grid and increasing load shedding across parts of the province. Lahore has also reportedly faced a shortfall of more than 1,000 MW in the distribution system.
The situation becomes more significant because hydropower generation has been rising at the same time. Higher monsoon river flows have boosted production from major projects including Tarbela, Mangla, Ghazi Barotha, Warsak and Chashma.
Hydropower has a major cost advantage. Once a hydropower project is built, its generation does not require a continuous supply of expensive imported fuel in the same way that oil and gas based plants do. When water is available, hydropower can therefore provide large volumes of relatively low cost electricity and reduce the need for expensive thermal generation.
The problem, however, is not simply a lack of generating capacity. It is the way Pakistan manages and balances its different sources of electricity.
Thermal power remains an important part of the national electricity system because it can provide dispatchable generation when demand rises or when other sources are unavailable. But the cost becomes a major concern when thermal plants have to operate extensively despite the availability of cheaper alternatives.
Pakistan’s dependence on thermal generation also creates vulnerability to fuel supply disruptions. If gas or oil is unavailable, thermal plants cannot operate at full capacity regardless of how much installed capacity exists on paper. This is precisely why the country can have nearly 49,651 MW of installed generation capacity and still experience significant shortages.
Hydropower presents a different challenge. Its availability depends heavily on seasonal water flows. During the monsoon, river levels increase and hydropower output can rise sharply. During drier periods, generation can decline. This means hydropower cannot simply replace every other source of electricity throughout the year.
The solution therefore is not to eliminate thermal power, but to use each generation source according to its economic and operational advantage. Hydropower should be maximised when water is available, while thermal generation should increasingly serve as a balancing and backup source where economically practical.
This makes investment in water storage particularly important. Projects such as Tarbela and Mangla can play a greater role in managing seasonal water availability, while expansion and rehabilitation of existing hydropower facilities can increase output without requiring an entirely new generation system.
Pakistan also needs stronger transmission infrastructure. Producing cheap electricity is not enough if the power cannot be transported efficiently to areas where demand is highest. Better transmission planning can allow more hydropower to reach major consumption centres and reduce the need for expensive local thermal generation.
The current situation therefore raises a broader policy question. Pakistan does not necessarily have a simple shortage of power plants. It has a shortage of reliable and affordable electricity at the right place and the right time.
If hydropower can exceed 7,000 MW during the monsoon while Punjab simultaneously faces a reported shortfall of up to 4,000 MW, the challenge clearly goes beyond generation capacity. Fuel supply, water management, transmission constraints, plant utilisation and sector finances all matter.
For Pakistan, the strategic priority should be to make maximum use of the cheapest available sources while maintaining enough flexible generation to protect the grid during periods of low water availability.
The real question for policymakers is therefore not simply how to generate more electricity. It is how to ensure that the electricity Pakistan already has, particularly low cost hydropower, is used as efficiently as possible before turning to more expensive thermal generation.
That shift could have a direct impact on electricity costs, industrial competitiveness and Pakistan’s long term energy security.

Pakistan’s rapidly expanding rooftop and distributed solar market is beginning to reshape not only the country’s energy system but also the economics of residential, commercial and industrial property. According to new analysis by the Pakistan Solar Association, distributed solar supplied nearly 27% of all electricity generated in Pakistan during fiscal year 2025, with approximately 51 terawatt-hours of generation not appearing in official grid side data.
The gap exists because a large share of Pakistan’s solar capacity is installed behind the meter, on homes, shops, offices, factories and agricultural properties. Electricity generated by these systems can be consumed directly on site without passing through the conventional grid, meaning distribution companies do not see the full scale of generation or underlying electricity consumption.
One of the clearest signs of the transformation can be seen in electricity demand patterns. Analysis of half hourly data from Lahore Electric Supply Company shows a rapidly deepening decline in grid demand during peak sunlight hours.
According to the Pakistan Solar Association, the midday demand profile was relatively flat at around 2.2 GW in 2024, but fell to approximately 765 MW in 2026. At the same time, demand rises sharply into the evening as solar generation declines, with the LESCO network recording an increase of more than 1.1 GW over roughly four hours.
The pattern demonstrates how rooftop solar is changing the traditional relationship between electricity consumption and the national grid.
The implications extend well beyond electricity markets. Pakistan’s solar expansion is increasingly turning rooftops into productive economic assets.
For residential property, a roof with sufficient space and structural capacity for solar panels can become an additional selling point. Homes capable of generating their own electricity may become increasingly attractive to buyers and tenants facing high utility costs.
The same trend is potentially even more significant in commercial and industrial real estate. Warehouses, factories, retail buildings and large office properties often have extensive roof areas that can be converted into distributed generation assets.
This creates a new dimension of property value: not simply how much floor space a building provides, but how much energy it can generate and how much electricity it can consume directly.
The Pakistan Solar Association also warns that the challenge is not limited to unrecorded generation. Parts of new electricity demand are also becoming less visible to network operators.
The growing electrification of two and three wheeled vehicles, which account for a significant portion of Pakistan’s electric vehicle transition, could create additional electricity demand that needs to be incorporated into future network planning.
This means Pakistan is experiencing two changes simultaneously: conventional grid demand is being displaced by behind the meter solar, while new forms of electricity consumption are emerging across homes, businesses and transport.
The association argues that failing to accurately capture distributed generation and new demand can lead to forecasting errors and inefficient investment in generation and network infrastructure.
Its research paper, Pakistan’s Solar Revolution: Scale, Blind Spots, and the Path to DER Aware Planning, recommends that Pakistan draw lessons from international approaches, including Australia’s integrated system planning and the United Kingdom’s focus on flexibility across transmission and distribution networks.
The central issue is visibility. A grid designed around a relatively predictable flow of electricity from large power plants to consumers becomes harder to manage when millions of properties begin producing electricity themselves.
For Pakistan’s real estate industry, the solar transition could gradually make energy performance a more important component of property value.
Developers may increasingly need to consider rooftop capacity, solar orientation, energy storage, electrical infrastructure and building efficiency when designing new projects. Buyers and investors may also begin evaluating properties according to their ability to reduce dependence on grid electricity.
This could eventually create a new category of property differentiation: buildings that are not only well located and efficiently designed, but also capable of generating and storing a meaningful share of their own electricity.
Pakistan’s solar adoption has been driven by a combination of high electricity costs, cheaper solar modules and persistent power shortages, according to the association’s analysis. The speed of the transition has nevertheless outpaced the ability of traditional energy statistics and planning systems to capture it.
Pakistan’s solar revolution is no longer simply an energy story. As rooftops become productive assets and buildings increasingly generate their own electricity, solar capacity, energy efficiency and power independence could become increasingly important factors in determining the future value of residential, commercial and industrial real es tate.

Punjab’s decision to establish a dedicated authority for identifying, managing and generating value from underused public assets could represent an important development for both the province’s real estate sector and its public finances. Government land, buildings and other properties are spread across provincial departments, autonomous institutions and public organisations. Some assets remain underutilised, some may be affected by encroachment or informal occupation, while others may not have been properly assessed for their current market value or future development potential.
At a time when the province faces continuing financial demands for infrastructure, urban development, education, healthcare and other public services, improving the management of existing government property could become an important economic strategy. The proposed Punjab Assets Management Authority could provide a mechanism for treating public land and property not simply as entries in departmental records, but as assets with economic, social and development potential.
One of the most important elements of the proposed framework is the development of a comprehensive digital inventory supported by a GIS based database. In a province as large as Punjab, asset records may be scattered across different departments and administrative systems. Ownership of a property may be recorded by one institution, its use may be controlled by another and its administrative management may fall under a third authority. A central digital system could help create a clearer picture of public assets by identifying their location, legal status, current use and possible market value.
However, improving asset management should not mean selling every valuable government property. A modern asset management strategy must determine the highest and most appropriate use of each asset. Some land may be needed for future hospitals, schools, parks, transport infrastructure or other public services. Other properties could generate long term value through leasing, joint development projects or partnerships with private investors.
From a real estate perspective, a more organised approach to government assets could also create new investment opportunities. Underused land in major urban centres may have potential for commercial, residential, industrial or mixed use development. Instead of selling land outright, the government could retain ownership of strategically important property while allowing private developers to participate in construction and operations. Such arrangements could create economic activity and recurring revenue while preserving long term public ownership.
The greatest test for the entire initiative, however, will be transparency. Government property is politically and economically sensitive, particularly when valuable land or commercial assets are involved. If valuations are not conducted independently or if disposal and leasing decisions are not carried out through open and competitive procedures, the reform could quickly lose public confidence.
Major transactions should therefore be supported by clear public information. Market valuations, valuation methods, reserve prices, bidding rules, successful bidders and final financial terms should be open to scrutiny. A digital platform could help make information about important assets and transactions more accessible, strengthening both public accountability and investor confidence.
Accountability should also extend beyond annual financial audits. The performance of the authority should be measured through clear and publicly available results. How many assets have been identified? How much land has been surveyed? How many encroached properties have been recovered? How many development projects have been approved, and how much revenue has been generated? Regular quarterly or semiannual reports could provide answers to these questions and allow citizens to assess whether the authority is creating real value or simply adding another layer to the provincial bureaucracy.
There is also a significant institutional risk. Pakistan has seen a number of reform bodies and task forces launched with ambitious objectives but weakened by overlapping authority, bureaucratic resistance, political intervention and poor implementation. To avoid the same outcome, the Punjab Assets Management Authority will require clear legal powers, effective access to information and professional expertise in real estate, finance, urban planning, law, valuation and technology.
Ultimately, the authority should be judged not by its establishment but by its results. If Punjab succeeds in developing a comprehensive record of public assets, determining their actual value, recovering encroached property and converting underused assets into transparent sources of revenue or public benefit, the initiative could become an important reform in provincial real estate and financial management.
If transparency weakens or the institution becomes another administrative layer without measurable outcomes, however, a significant opportunity could be lost.
The concept of transforming Punjab’s underused public assets into a more productive portfolio is strong. Its real success will depend on accurate records, independent valuation, transparent decision making, effective oversight and measurable results.

The proposed privatisation of FESCO, GEPCO and IESCO has reached a stage where the central question is no longer simply how the government will sell stakes in these companies or at what price. The more important question is: what kind of business, regulatory framework and electricity market will private investors actually inherit?
Interest from nearly a dozen domestic and foreign investors, including four overseas entities, is encouraging. It suggests that Pakistan’s electricity distribution business still has commercial appeal if the operating environment can be made sufficiently predictable.
But the conditions being sought by potential investors reveal another reality. They are not merely pricing normal commercial risk into their bids; they are also pricing Pakistan’s policy and contractual credibility risk.
Investors are seeking protection against the reopening of agreements, stronger regulatory safeguards, timely tariff adjustments, longer term tariff certainty and protection from arbitrary policy changes.
Given Pakistan’s history, these demands are hardly surprising.
Repeated renegotiation of agreements in the power and infrastructure sectors, sudden policy shifts and regulatory uncertainty have made investors cautious. Past renegotiations with independent power producers have also sent a clear message to outside investors: a legally binding agreement today may not necessarily remain untouched tomorrow.
The government must therefore distinguish between demands that provide legitimate commercial protection and those that merely transfer private sector risks to electricity consumers or the national exchequer.
A demand for transparent and predictable regulation, for instance, is entirely reasonable. If a private operator is expected to invest billions of rupees in a distribution network over many years, it needs to know how tariffs will be determined, how investment plans will be approved and whether political changes could suddenly disrupt previously approved business decisions.
The government could also consider political-risk guarantees backed by multilateral institutions. Such guarantees would not only protect investors; they could also impose greater discipline on the state by making it more difficult to casually alter policies or contractual commitments.
There must, however, be clear red lines.
If returns for privatised DISCOs are linked to the US dollar, exchange-rate risk would ultimately be transferred to Pakistani consumers or the government. For a country whose external account remains structurally vulnerable, this could create another long-term financial burden.
The same caution applies to demands for complete exemption from existing obligations to purchase expensive electricity.
A private DISCO should eventually have the ability to procure cheaper electricity and benefit from a more competitive power market. But privatisation cannot mean that profitable parts of the business are transferred to private operators while the state and consumers remain responsible for costly generation contracts and capacity payments.
Before privatisation, another question must therefore be answered clearly: what exactly is the buyer acquiring?
Which liabilities will move with the company? Who will be responsible for employee pensions? How will outstanding receivables be treated? What portion of accumulated circular debt will remain on the company’s books, and what portion will stay with the government?
If these issues are not settled before the sale, today’s privatisation could easily become tomorrow’s dispute.
This is particularly important because the financial burden of state-owned enterprises is already substantial. According to the State Bank of Pakistan, total liabilities of public-sector enterprises have reached around Rs3.11 trillion.
Privatisation, therefore, cannot be treated simply as the transfer of an inefficient public-sector company into private hands. For a new owner to operate commercially, the balance sheet must first be made reasonably workable.
Perhaps the most critical issue is the tariff framework.
Investors reportedly prefer a predictable tariff-control period of seven to ten years rather than five. In principle, this deserves serious consideration because investments in electricity distribution networks take years to recover.
But longer tariff certainty cannot become an unconditional guarantee of returns.
Any long term framework should be tied to measurable improvements in distribution losses, recoveries, service quality, complaint resolution, reliability of supply and actual investment in the network.
An operator that improves performance should be rewarded. But consumers should not be required to indefinitely compensate a private operator that fails to meet agreed standards.
Pakistan may also eventually need to reconsider its existing uniform national tariff structure. A system that treats efficient and inefficient distribution companies almost alike weakens incentives for improvement.
Any transition, however, will have to be carefully designed. Consumers should not suddenly face higher tariffs simply because they happen to live in a particular distribution area.
The more sustainable solution is to separate commercial performance from social policy.
If the government wants to subsidise poorer households or particular regions, those subsidies should be provided transparently through the national budget rather than hidden inside the balance sheets of distribution companies.
Private investors cannot reasonably be expected to operate as instruments of an unclear fiscal or social policy.
Ultimately, the objective of privatising FESCO, GEPCO and IESCO should not simply be to sell three distribution companies.
The stakes are much larger for Pakistan.
If the government can complete these transactions with clearly defined liabilities, predictable tariffs, strong regulation, consumer safeguards and contracts that are not reopened whenever the political climate changes, the impact will extend well beyond the electricity sector.
It could send a far more important message to international investors: Pakistan is not only capable of signing long-term commercial agreements; it is also capable of honouring them.

Pakistan’s solar transformation is entering a new phase, and its impact is increasingly moving beyond the electricity sector into housing, commercial property and urban development.
For the real estate industry, the important question is no longer simply whether a house, office or commercial building has solar panels. The next question is whether a property can generate, store and intelligently manage enough of its own electricity to reduce dependence on an increasingly expensive and changing grid.
The scale of the shift is visible in net metering data.
Electricity purchased by the grid from net metered consumers reached around 270 GWh in June 2026, compared with barely 20 GWh in June 2023. In just three years, the volume has increased more than thirteen fold.
The trend was even more pronounced in April 2026, when net-metered electricity purchases approached 390 GWh, compared with about 310 GWh in April 2025 and around 100 GWh in 2024.
These numbers matter for the property market because rooftop solar has become a significant part of household and commercial investment decisions. Houses, offices, factories, shopping facilities and other buildings are increasingly being assessed not only on location and construction quality but also on their ability to control future energy costs.
Pakistan is believed to have imported more than 55,000MW worth of solar panels cumulatively, while officially net metered installations represent only a fraction of that capacity.
That gap suggests that much of the solar market exists outside conventional net metering. Panels are being used for direct self consumption, commercial and industrial installations, hybrid systems and, increasingly, solar systems connected with battery storage.
This distinction is particularly important for real estate developers.
Under the earlier model, rooftop solar was often treated as an additional feature installed after construction. In the emerging market, energy infrastructure could become part of the original design of residential and commercial projects.
Developers may increasingly have to consider roof orientation, available solar area, electrical load planning, battery spaces, ventilation and safety requirements, backup systems and smart energy management while designing new buildings.
The change in regulation could accelerate this transition.
With net billing replacing the previous net metering arrangement for new connections, exporting surplus electricity to the grid is expected to become less financially attractive than under the earlier system.
That changes the economics of rooftop solar.
Instead of designing systems mainly to export excess daytime electricity, homeowners and businesses will have a stronger incentive to use more of their solar generation themselves.
Battery storage becomes central to that model.
Lithium battery imports reached a record USD88 million in July, signalling that storage is rapidly moving from a niche product towards a more important part of Pakistan’s energy market.
Only two years ago, spending on lithium battery imports was extremely small compared with solar panel imports. The gap has now narrowed sharply.
For property owners, batteries solve one of solar power’s biggest limitations: timing.
A conventional rooftop system generates most of its electricity during daylight hours. A battery equipped property can store part of that electricity and use it in the evening or during periods when grid electricity is expensive or unavailable.
For residential real estate, this could gradually change what buyers consider a well equipped home.
Solar panels alone may no longer represent the premium energy feature they once did. Buyers may increasingly compare properties on the basis of installed solar capacity, battery backup, expected grid dependence, electrical efficiency and the ability to operate essential loads during outages.
The same shift could be even more important in commercial real estate.
Electricity is a major operating expense for offices, retail buildings, warehouses and other commercial properties. Buildings capable of producing and storing part of their own electricity could potentially offer occupiers greater predictability over energy costs.
For landlords and developers, energy performance may therefore become increasingly relevant to tenant demand and long-term building competitiveness.
Housing societies and large residential developments also need to consider the broader consequences.
If thousands of households within a development independently install solar panels and batteries, the electricity demand profile of that community can change substantially. Daytime grid demand can fall while evening consumption may also begin to decline as households discharge stored solar electricity.
That means electrical infrastructure planned around traditional consumption patterns may no longer reflect how future communities actually use power.
Developers planning new housing schemes therefore have an opportunity to think beyond individual rooftop systems.
Future projects could incorporate solar ready roofs, battery ready electrical infrastructure, energy-efficient street lighting, smart meters, community level storage and better management of common-area electricity consumption from the planning stage.
The transition also has implications for property valuation.
Location, plot size, construction quality and neighbourhood infrastructure will remain fundamental factors in real estate value. But in a country where electricity costs have become a major household and business concern, the operating cost of a property could increasingly influence purchasing and rental decisions.
A building that requires significantly less grid electricity may offer an economic advantage over a similar property with high recurring energy expenses.
This does not mean Pakistan’s solar boom is ending because net-metering rules are changing.
The opposite may happen.
Solar adoption could increasingly shift from a model based on selling surplus electricity to the grid towards one centred on self-consumption and storage.
For the power sector, that creates a planning challenge.
For real estate, however, it signals the emergence of a different type of property: one that is not merely connected to utility infrastructure but actively generates, stores and manages energy.
Pakistan’s first solar wave changed rooftops.
The battery wave could begin changing the design, economics and marketability of the buildings beneath them.
For developers, housing societies and property investors, that is no longer just an energy sector trend. It is becoming a real estate planning issue.

The financial calculation behind buying or building a home in Pakistan is no longer limited to land prices, construction costs, location and available amenities. Persistently high electricity tariffs have turned the monthly cost of running a home into an important financial consideration. As a result, rooftop solar systems are gradually becoming part of residential property economics and the wider investment made in a home, particularly in major cities.
Amid rising electricity tariffs and growing pressure on household budgets, a 10 kilowatt solar system is emerging as a financially viable option for families that can afford the initial cost. According to industry estimates, a 10kW system in Pakistan can generate around 1,200 to 1,500 units of electricity per month, depending on location, weather conditions and the availability of sunlight.
This level of generation is particularly significant for larger homes where air conditioners, water pumps, refrigerators and other electrical appliances result in relatively high electricity consumption. Using solar electricity generated at home reduces the need to purchase expensive power from the national grid and can therefore significantly lower monthly electricity bills.
Current estimates suggest that some consumers paying electricity costs of between Rs45 and Rs60 per unit may save around Rs50,000 to Rs90,000 per month by consuming the electricity they generate themselves. Surplus electricity supplied to the national grid can provide an additional financial benefit, although the price paid for such electricity is determined under rules set by the government and the National Electric Power Regulatory Authority, and may change in the future.
For example, if a household consumes around 1,200 units of electricity per month and its 10kW solar system generates approximately 1,400 units, some surplus electricity may be supplied to the grid after meeting daytime household requirements. Estimates suggest that such a household could receive a combined monthly financial benefit of around Rs55,000 to Rs60,000 through direct savings on electricity consumption and compensation for surplus power.
The central question, however, is not simply the price of a solar system, but how long it takes for the investment to recover its cost. The current initial cost of a standard 10kW solar system is estimated at around Rs1.5 million to Rs2.2 million, depending on the quality of panels, inverter, other equipment and installation standards. At prevailing electricity tariffs, the investment could potentially recover its cost through savings on electricity bills within approximately two and a half to four years.
It is this payback period that makes solar energy particularly relevant from a real estate perspective. Not every costly improvement made to a house necessarily recovers its full value when the property is sold. A functioning solar system, however, can reduce monthly electricity expenses over many years, improving both the practical utility and overall financial appeal of a home.
If two otherwise similar homes are compared, the property with substantially lower monthly electricity expenses may prove more attractive to a buyer. Tenants may also prefer a house where monthly power bills are relatively lower. This does not mean, however, that every rupee spent on solar equipment will automatically translate into an equivalent increase in the property's sale price. The age of the panels and inverter, equipment quality, warranties, maintenance, battery condition and future government policy will all influence the system's actual value.
Pakistan's rapid expansion of solar energy has also created new challenges for the national electricity system. According to analysts, solar capacity connected through net metering had reached approximately 7,000 megawatts by June 2026, representing an almost 37 fold increase over six years. Estimates have also placed the combined generation capacity of net metering and solar systems operating independently of the national grid at around 20,000 megawatts.
During daylight hours, when large numbers of households and businesses use their own solar electricity, demand from the national grid can fall sharply. After sunset, however, that demand rises again. This pattern of reduced daytime demand followed by a rapid increase in the evening creates technical and financial challenges for electricity generation and transmission. The government's move to revise net metering conditions and shift towards net billing is also being viewed in this context.
NEPRA introduced new regulations for consumers who generate and use solar electricity in 2026, making it increasingly important to calculate the financial benefits of residential solar systems with greater caution. It would be risky for a homebuyer or investor to estimate returns over the next 20 years solely on the basis of today's rate for surplus electricity supplied to the grid, as official purchase rates, billing methods and other regulations may change in the future.
These changes have also increased the importance of batteries in residential solar installations. Pakistani consumers are increasingly moving away from relatively small batteries towards larger storage systems in the 14 to 16 kilowatt hour range. Falling battery prices, growing consumer confidence and the desire to use self generated electricity rather than export it to the grid are among the main factors driving this trend.
In simple terms, a battery energy storage system uses a large battery to store surplus electricity generated by solar panels during the day so that it can be used later in the evening or at night. This can further reduce a household's dependence on electricity drawn from the national grid. The government is also encouraging energy storage as a way to better manage the difference between daytime and nighttime electricity demand caused by the rapid growth of solar power.
If the financial benefit of supplying surplus solar electricity to the national grid declines further in the future, storing electricity in batteries for personal use could become increasingly important. In that scenario, adequate battery capacity alongside solar panels could become an important financial and practical feature of residential properties.
This transformation also carries an important message for real estate developers, builders, investors and homebuyers. New residential projects could benefit from incorporating adequate rooftop space, suitable orientation for solar panels, appropriate electrical wiring, secure locations for inverters and provision for larger batteries at the initial planning and construction stage.
Similarly, when buying a house that already has a solar system installed, simply counting the number of panels on the roof will not be enough. Buyers may increasingly need to examine the system's generation capacity, the age of its panels and inverter, remaining warranty coverage, actual electricity production over previous months and the standard of maintenance.
Pakistan's rapid solar expansion has not resulted solely from government policy or growing interest in environmentally friendly energy. Between fiscal years 2021 and 2025, the rupee depreciated by around 75 percent, electricity tariffs increased by nearly 140 percent and imported solar panel prices fell by approximately 60 percent. Together, these developments fundamentally changed the financial calculation for residential solar. Expensive grid electricity combined with relatively cheaper solar panels has made household solar systems more financially practical for families that can provide the initial investment.
Some estimates suggest that a quality solar system with a potential life of 20 to 25 years could generate total savings of between Rs15 million and Rs25 million. These figures, however, are long term projections. Actual savings will depend on future electricity tariffs, system performance, equipment replacement and maintenance costs, battery life and government policy.
The most important lesson for the real estate sector is that the financial value of a home may increasingly be judged by more than its price per marla or square foot. Homebuyers are also likely to consider how much the property will cost to operate every month. A house that generates a substantial share of its own electricity, reduces energy expenses during the summer and has the capacity to store power for future use may have greater practical appeal than a conventional home.
Even so, solar energy should be viewed less as an investment promising guaranteed returns and more as an asset capable of reducing the long term operating cost of a home. Electricity prices, net billing regulations, battery technology and solar equipment costs will continue to evolve. For homeowners and buyers, the more sensible decision will therefore be one based on actual electricity consumption, available rooftop space, the quality of the solar system, investment capacity and the possibility of future changes in energy policy.

August 5 is observed in Pakistan as Youm e Istehsal Kashmir. The occasion is usually discussed in the context of constitutional change, political rights and the wider Kashmir dispute. However, one of the most significant consequences of the decisions taken on August 5, 2019 relates directly to land, housing and ownership of immovable property.
For this reason, the removal of Article 35A cannot be viewed solely as a constitutional event. It also marked a structural change in the real estate and land ownership framework of Indian administered Jammu and Kashmir.
Article 35A was introduced through the Constitution Application to Jammu and Kashmir Order of May 14, 1954. The provision did not itself set out every restriction governing property transactions. Instead, it empowered and constitutionally protected the Jammu and Kashmir legislature’s authority to define permanent residents and grant them special rights relating to government employment, settlement, scholarships and the acquisition of immovable property. Local laws imposing restrictions on other Indian citizens in these areas were protected from being struck down for violating fundamental rights.
This arrangement meant that land in Kashmir was not treated merely as a commodity available to the highest bidder. Property ownership was linked with residence, local identity, economic control and demographic protection. People who were not recognised as permanent residents could not ordinarily enter the property market and establish permanent settlement in the same manner available in most other parts of India.
Many Kashmiris therefore viewed Article 35A as a legal wall protecting their land, culture and long term economic interests.
On August 5, 2019, the Indian government issued a presidential order and secured parliamentary approval for measures that fundamentally changed Jammu and Kashmir’s constitutional status. The Jammu and Kashmir Reorganisation Act 2019 subsequently divided the former state into the Union Territories of Jammu and Kashmir and Ladakh, with the reorganisation taking effect on October 31, 2019. On December 11, 2023, the Supreme Court of India upheld the constitutional measures taken in 2019, leaving the new arrangement in force within India’s domestic legal system.
The property implications became clearer during 2020. New domicile rules made additional categories of people eligible for domicile status, including those who had lived in Jammu and Kashmir for fifteen years or had studied there for seven years and appeared in a class ten or class twelve examination at a local educational institution. This replaced the earlier system centred on permanent resident certificates with a broader domicile framework.
Further changes followed in October 2020 when several local land laws were amended and others were repealed. The removal of permanent resident requirements from laws including the Jammu and Kashmir Development Act enabled Indian citizens from outside the region to purchase land that was not classified as agricultural. Officials maintained that agricultural land would remain protected, although the legal framework also permits changes in land use for specified development, commercial, educational, health and other purposes subject to approval and planning requirements.
The Indian government presents these reforms as a means of establishing uniform laws, attracting investment, developing industry, improving infrastructure and creating employment. Official statements have argued that the earlier constitutional arrangement restricted development and prevented Jammu and Kashmir from fully benefiting from national laws and investment programmes. The government has also highlighted industrial policies and major investment proposals as evidence of economic opportunity following the changes.
Pakistan, several Kashmiri political parties and local critics offer a sharply different interpretation. They argue that removing protections associated with land and permanent residency could weaken the economic position of Kashmiris and expose the region to demographic and property market pressures. Pakistan maintains that the revised domicile and land ownership regime is intended to alter Kashmir’s demographic and political character. Local opponents have also raised concerns about speculative purchasing, rising land values and the ability of small property owners to compete with larger investors.
From a real estate perspective, the central question is not simply how many investment projects or commercial developments are announced. The more important issue is who receives the value created by that development.
Higher land prices may benefit existing owners in the short term. However, where local incomes, home ownership and access to affordable housing do not rise at the same pace, property growth can also produce displacement, unaffordable housing and wider economic inequality. Capital entering a fragile market can create employment and infrastructure, but without strong safeguards it can also concentrate land ownership in the hands of more powerful investors.
Kashmir’s property market cannot therefore be treated as an ordinary investment market. Every property transfer, land use conversion, industrial estate, tourism project and allocation of public land may affect local livelihoods, agriculture, the environment and the region’s future demographic composition.
Transparent information is essential. Detailed data should be available on property buyers, their residency status, changes in land classification, agricultural land conversions, market prices and the proportion of land remaining under local ownership. Such information would allow development claims and demographic concerns to be assessed through evidence rather than competing political narratives.
Youm e Istehsal Kashmir is also a reminder that land is more than a physical asset recorded in a revenue document. It represents home, inheritance, livelihood, identity and a community’s connection with its future.
The removal of Article 35A changed the legal entrance to Kashmir’s property market. It also made one question more urgent than ever: who will decide how Kashmir’s land is developed, and who will ultimately receive the greatest share of the value created from it?

The controversy surrounding recent conservation work at Mohra Moradu and Sirkap raises a question that goes far beyond two archaeological locations: should ancient remains be altered in an effort to protect them, or should conservation focus on preserving the original material that has survived through centuries?
This is not simply a disagreement between a provincial department and an international organisation. It concerns Pakistan’s approach to heritage management, urban planning, land use and the treatment of cultural assets that cannot be replaced once their original character is lost.
Taxila was inscribed on the World Heritage List in 1980. It is not a single monument but a serial property consisting of 18 archaeological components. Sirkap provides important evidence of the evolution of urban settlements in the region, while Mohra Moradu represents the Buddhist monastic culture that once flourished across the Taxila valley. UNESCO describes Taxila as one of the most important archaeological sites in Asia.
The current dispute emerged after reports that surviving ancient masonry had been replaced with new construction in some places and that the height of original walls had been increased. According to reports citing officials and UNESCO discussions, the organisation asked Pakistan to reverse interventions considered harmful to the authenticity and integrity of the sites and to submit detailed records of the work. The reports also warned that a failure to take corrective action could place Taxila on the List of World Heritage in Danger.
The Punjab Archaeology Department rejects the description of the work as reconstruction. It maintains that the interventions were intended to stabilise vulnerable remains, prevent further deterioration and protect the sites from environmental damage. The department also says that national and international experts were given a detailed technical presentation during a recent joint visit. Its position deserves to be heard and assessed fairly.
However, good intentions alone cannot determine whether work at an archaeological site is acceptable. Every intervention must be justified through scientific evidence, appropriate materials, detailed documentation and professional accountability.
UNESCO’s operational guidance states that reconstruction of archaeological remains or historic buildings is justified only in exceptional circumstances. It must be based on complete and detailed documentation and must not rely on conjecture. Authenticity is not limited to visual appearance; it is also expressed through original form, design, materials, construction techniques, location and historical setting.
The purpose of archaeological conservation is therefore not to make ruins appear taller, more complete or more visually attractive. An incomplete wall may itself be an authentic historical record. Adding new masonry may improve the site’s appearance, but it becomes problematic when the intervention hides the original limits of the structure, replaces ancient material or makes it difficult for visitors and researchers to distinguish evidence from modern addition.
At the same time, the genuine conservation challenges facing Taxila should not be underestimated. Its exposed remains are vulnerable to extreme weather, vegetation, earthquakes, industrial expansion, quarrying and illegal excavation. Technical intervention may therefore be necessary in some places. The central question is not whether intervention should ever occur, but how much should be done, which materials should be used, whether the work is reversible and whether every decision is properly recorded.
The most credible response from the authorities would be complete transparency. Conservation plans, heritage impact assessments, before and after photographs, technical drawings, laboratory testing of materials, compatibility studies and archaeological research records should be placed before independent specialists and, where appropriate, made publicly accessible. UNESCO reportedly requested this specific documentation in relation to the work at Mohra Moradu and Sirkap.
An independent review panel should include archaeologists, conservation architects, structural engineers, geologists, material scientists, urban planners and heritage law specialists. Its task should be to distinguish essential stabilisation from excessive intervention, identify any additions that threaten the original fabric and recommend which measures can safely be reversed.
The present dispute also exposes a wider institutional weakness. Decisions concerning nationally and internationally significant heritage properties should not depend solely on the discretion of an individual department or project team. Work should begin only after a formal heritage impact assessment, multidisciplinary approval, full photographic recording and consultation with relevant international bodies.
Taxila has faced similar risks before. An attempt to construct a stadium within Bhir Mound in 1998 threatened another component of the World Heritage property. A subsequent UNESCO mission described the decision as a serious mistake and called for impact assessments, defined buffer zones, coordination with planning agencies and an overall management strategy for Taxila.
Nearly three decades later, the reappearance of comparable concerns suggests that the issue is institutional rather than isolated. Pakistan needs enforceable conservation procedures that require independent scrutiny before work begins, rather than investigation and corrective action after potentially irreversible interventions have already been completed.
Taxila’s value does not depend on whether its ruins look new, complete or impressive to visitors. Its importance lies in the credibility of the stones, foundations, streets and surviving walls as genuine evidence of the civilisations that shaped the region.
The government should therefore avoid treating the matter as a contest of institutional authority or national prestige. It should approach it as a responsibility to future generations. Where irreplaceable cultural heritage is at risk, transparency, scientific conservation, minimum intervention and compliance with recognised international standards must take priority over visual improvement, tourism promotion or short term development targets.

Pakistan’s real estate market is showing renewed activity, with rising demand reported in Karachi, Lahore and Islamabad. Market observers estimate that residential property prices have increased by 10% to 15% in some locations, although the trend does not appear to be uniform across every city, project or property category.
The recent movement is being driven by a combination of lower transaction taxes, geopolitical uncertainty in the Middle East, investment by overseas Pakistanis, limited housing supply and the gradual expansion of subsidised housing finance.
One of the most immediate factors is the reduction in withholding taxes on property transactions. Under the Finance Act 2025–26, the withholding tax on property purchases by tax filers was reduced from 2.5% to 1.25%, while the tax on property sales was cut from 5.5% to 2.75%.
These reductions have lowered the cost of completing property transactions for both buyers and sellers. Some investors who had postponed purchases because of high taxes and transaction expenses may now be returning to the market.
Limited supply is another important reason behind higher prices. In Karachi, the number of completed housing units in established and well serviced areas remains restricted compared with demand. Buyers are increasingly choosing completed homes and apartments instead of newly launched projects that may take several years to deliver.
Ready properties offer immediate possession, established infrastructure and fewer construction related risks. This explains why demand may rise sharply in selected localities even when the broader property market remains mixed.
A similar pattern is visible in Lahore and Islamabad, where investors are showing greater interest in developed housing schemes and completed high rise residential projects. Properties with existing roads, electricity, water, security and nearby commercial facilities are attracting more buyers than undeveloped plots or projects facing uncertain completion schedules.
This indicates that the current recovery is selective. Demand is not necessarily increasing across every category of land, housing scheme or apartment development. Projects with clear ownership, regulatory approvals, completed infrastructure and immediate usability are in a stronger position.
Geopolitical tensions in the Middle East have also influenced investment decisions. Some overseas Pakistanis are diversifying their assets by moving part of their capital into Pakistan’s property market. For them, domestic real estate may provide a long term asset, rental income or a future home in their country of origin.
The Prime Minister Apna Ghar housing finance programme is supporting another segment of the market: first time and middle income homebuyers. Banks have reportedly approved PKR 204 billion in housing finance under the programme, while around PKR 27 billion has been disbursed.
The difference between approved and disbursed financing is significant. It suggests that documentation requirements, property verification, bank conditions, processing delays and the shortage of affordable homes may still be limiting the programme’s practical reach.
The reported 10% to 15% increase in residential prices should also be interpreted carefully. Such estimates may reflect activity in particular neighbourhoods or completed projects rather than an equal rise across entire cities. A limited number of high value transactions can create the appearance of a wider price increase.
A sustainable recovery would require stronger evidence from registered property transactions, housing finance disbursements, construction activity, rental trends and the launch of new residential projects.
Pakistan’s property market cannot achieve long term stability through investor demand alone. Faster project approvals, transparent land records, improved access to construction finance, stronger buyer protection and a larger supply of affordable homes will also be necessary.
If demand continues to rise without a corresponding increase in supply, property prices may move further beyond the reach of first time buyers. This could benefit existing owners and short term investors while making the housing shortage more difficult for ordinary families.
However, if increased demand is matched by new construction, the current trend could support employment and growth in cement, steel, glass, tiles, paint, transportation, banking and other related industries.
The real test of the present market recovery is therefore not simply how much property prices rise. Its success will depend on whether new investment produces more homes, better urban infrastructure and affordable housing opportunities for a wider section of the population.

The Senate subcommittee’s review of forest management in Gilgit Baltistan is not limited to timber cutting or the pending cases of licensed contractors. It highlights a wider policy challenge involving land use, natural resource protection, local economic activity, public safety and the future of construction and urban development in the mountain region.
Licensed forest contractors have raised concerns about long delays in legal timber harvesting, complicated government procedures, security risks and disputes that have remained unresolved for decades. These complaints cannot simply be ignored, as every lawful business requires an administrative system that is transparent, efficient and predictable.
When permits, contracts and legal disputes remain pending for years or even decades, confidence in both business and government institutions is weakened. In this context, the subcommittee’s decision to review pending cases, re examine forest working plans and remove unnecessary obstacles to lawful activity is a welcome step.
However, business facilitation must not come at the cost of weakening the protections needed to preserve one of Pakistan’s most limited and valuable natural resources. The forests of Gilgit Baltistan cannot be viewed only as a source of commercial timber. They help stabilise mountain land, reduce soil erosion, protect water catchment areas and regulate the flow of water from rain and melting snow.
These natural functions are also essential for protecting residential settlements, agricultural land, roads, bridges, hotels, tourism destinations and other construction projects across the region. Tree roots hold mountain soil together and provide support to vulnerable slopes. When forests are removed, the soil gradually loses stability, increasing the danger of landslides, falling rocks, flash floods and land subsidence.
These risks directly affect the real estate market. A house, shop, hotel or residential project cannot be considered safe merely because its structure is strong. Even an expensive building may face serious danger if it is located near an unstable slope, a blocked natural drainage channel or an area where forest cover is rapidly disappearing.
The expansion of tourism and construction activity in Gilgit Baltistan is increasing demand for land. Hotels, guest houses, resorts, residential buildings and commercial properties are being developed in different valleys and towns. In this environment, unplanned or excessive tree cutting can make land use risks even more serious.
When trees are removed from a valley or mountain slope, the consequences are not limited to the natural environment. The development potential, market value and long term safety of nearby land may also be affected. Forest policy, therefore, cannot be separated from real estate regulation and regional planning.
Many forests in Gilgit Baltistan are privately or collectively owned by local communities. Their ownership rights must be respected, and they should not be denied lawful economic benefits from forest resources. However, private ownership does not mean that forests and land can be used without regulation.
An individual or community may benefit from its property, but an activity that creates risks for an entire valley, settlement, river, road or neighbouring population cannot be treated as a purely private matter. The state has a responsibility to establish scientifically determined limits for forest use and ensure that legal harvesting does not exceed the environmental capacity of an area.
Every forest area should have a clear and updated working plan. Such a plan should record the number and condition of trees, identify how much timber may be harvested safely, specify areas where cutting must be completely prohibited and explain how new trees will be planted after harvesting.
These plans must not remain limited to paperwork. Environmental specialists, forest officials, local communities, district administrations, land use planners and construction experts should all be involved in their preparation.
Before tree cutting is approved, authorities should assess its possible effects on nearby settlements, roads, rivers, mountain slopes and proposed construction projects. Decisions about forests must be based on the wider safety and development needs of the entire area.
The complaints raised by contractors regarding security threats, administrative barriers and excessive delays require urgent attention. Clear deadlines should be introduced for the approval of contracts, permits and dispute resolution.
A digital record of applications, permissions, approved timber quantities and transportation could also improve transparency. Contractors, local communities and government departments should have access to consistent and verifiable information.
Local residents should also be consulted while contracts and forest management plans are prepared. Communities that have lived near forests for generations possess valuable knowledge about the area’s land, water channels, access routes and natural hazards.
Their involvement could improve decision making and strengthen local monitoring of illegal activities. It would also reduce the risk of policies being imposed without considering the needs and experience of the people most directly affected.
Administrative reform should make lawful business easier, but it must not become an excuse to increase tree cutting or weaken oversight. Faster decisions are necessary, but every approval must remain subject to environmental limits and land safety requirements.
The subcommittee was informed that people involved in illegal tree cutting may face penalties of up to three times the market value of the timber. Several vehicles allegedly used for timber smuggling also remain in government custody.
These measures appear strict, but the true effectiveness of any law depends on consistent and impartial enforcement. If action is taken only against a limited number of individuals while influential operators, facilitators or officials involved in possible collusion remain protected, penalties will fail to control illegal activity.
Illegal tree cutting is rarely limited to the person who physically removes the timber. It may involve organised networks responsible for transportation, storage, purchasing and sale. Effective enforcement must therefore target the entire chain rather than isolated offenders.
Closed circuit television cameras, digital vehicle tracking, identification marks on approved timber and online permits can strengthen monitoring. However, technology cannot replace institutional integrity, accountability and political commitment.
The future of Gilgit Baltistan’s forests is not only a matter for the forest department. It is directly connected with housing, tourism, highways, water resources, agriculture, power projects, disaster management and land values.
When forests are protected, mountain soil, water channels, residential settlements and buildings receive greater natural protection. Forest conservation should therefore be treated as an essential part of real estate planning and public infrastructure policy.
Future regulations should maintain a complete record of every tree approved for cutting, the legal authority under which it is removed and the responsibility for planting replacement trees.
Authorities should identify high risk zones where commercial harvesting is prohibited because of the danger of landslides, flooding, soil erosion or damage to water catchment areas.
Similarly, approval for new housing, hotels and tourism developments should depend on a proper assessment of whether the project affects forest land, natural drains, unstable slopes or water channels.
In mountain regions, building permission should be linked with environmental and forest clearances. This approach may prevent costly damage to lives, property and public infrastructure in the future.
Pakistan already has limited forest cover, while climate change is making mountain regions more vulnerable to floods, extreme rainfall and unstable slopes. Under these conditions, the country cannot afford further regulatory neglect, illegal harvesting or poorly planned construction.
Facilitating lawful business, protecting community rights, resolving disputes on time and conserving forests are not conflicting goals. They can support one another when policy is based on scientific planning, transparent administration and equal enforcement of the law.
The guiding principle must remain clear: the economic benefit obtained from timber may be temporary, but the damage caused by forest loss to land, settlements and buildings can continue for generations.
Every decision regarding the forests of Gilgit Baltistan should therefore be made with long term environmental sustainability, land safety and the protection of human settlements as its highest priorities.

Pakistan’s electricity challenge is no longer limited to how much power the country can produce. The more pressing questions are when that electricity is available, which source produces it and how quickly generation can respond when demand rises.
Nearly 125 billion units of electricity were generated for the national grid during the financial year 2025-26, an increase of only 1.5 percent over the previous year. The overall number appears relatively stable, but the generation mix reveals a major change taking place inside the electricity system.
Hydropower generation reached a record level of nearly 40 billion units and contributed about 31 percent of total grid electricity. This large supply of low-cost power helped contain average generation costs, but it could not fully resolve the new challenge emerging during evening hours.
The challenge is timing, not only supply
Solar systems are spreading rapidly across homes, shops, offices, farms and industrial facilities. During daylight hours, many consumers produce a significant portion of the electricity they need through their own solar panels.
This does not necessarily mean that electricity consumption has disappeared. It means that part of the consumption has moved away from the national grid and behind the consumer’s electricity meter.
Government estimates indicate that rooftop solar installations across Pakistan have exceeded 20,000 megawatts. Behind-the-meter solar capacity has been estimated at around 12,000 to 14,000MW and could be even higher. This rapidly growing capacity has significantly reduced the electricity consumers draw from the grid during sunny hours.
The position changes after sunset. Homes continue using lights, fans and air conditioners, while shops and commercial activities remain operational. Solar generation, however, falls rapidly and eventually stops.
A large volume of demand then returns to the national grid within a relatively short period. This pattern of weak daytime grid demand followed by a steep evening increase is commonly described as the “duck curve”.
Why was more coal needed despite record hydropower?
An important question arises from the annual generation figures. If hydropower production was at a record level, why did Pakistan have to generate substantially more electricity from imported coal?
One major reason was the shortfall in electricity generated from imported liquefied natural gas, or RLNG.
RLNG-based generation ended the year around 19 percent below the planned reference level, leaving a shortfall of almost four billion units.
Modern RLNG plants can play an important role in meeting changes in grid demand because their output can generally be adjusted more easily than that of traditional baseload plants. However, limited fuel availability prevented the system from obtaining the planned level of RLNG generation.
Imported-coal generation was increased to fill the gap. It finished approximately 43 percent above the planned reference level, producing almost four billion additional units.
Coal plants are not simply switched on when the sun sets. Instead, they may have to remain operational for longer periods so that dependable thermal generation is available when evening and nighttime demand rises.
What the economic merit order shows
The Independent System and Market Operator, or ISMO, arranges available power plants according to their incremental generation cost. This ranking is known as the economic merit order.
In simple terms, the system first attempts to obtain electricity from plants with lower variable costs. As electricity demand rises, plants placed further down the list, with higher generation costs, may also have to be dispatched.
ISMO’s website lists economic merit orders for July 2026, including separate publications for July 5 and July 12. Its market data section also provides 2026 datasets comparing marginal prices with electricity demand, along with separate marginal-price information.
The marginal price can be understood as the cost associated with the final generating plant needed to meet demand during a particular period. When evening demand requires a higher-cost plant to enter the system, the marginal cost of electricity for that period may rise.
A costly plant is not always an off-merit plant
It would be misleading to assume that every expensive power plant is operated unnecessarily or in violation of the merit order.
The system operator may have to dispatch a particular plant to maintain voltage, manage a transmission limitation, replace an unavailable generator or protect the stability of the grid in a specific region.
ISMO therefore publishes system reports alongside the economic merit order, including information on plants operated for system security and under security-constrained dispatch. These reports are essential for distinguishing between a plant dispatched because of its cost ranking and one operated because of a technical or grid-security requirement.
Solar is lowering costs, but the grid needs flexibility
It would be wrong to describe solar power itself as the problem.
Solar is providing consumers with lower-cost daytime electricity, reducing their reliance on imported fuels and easing pressure on the grid during sunny hours.
The real difficulty is that Pakistan’s electricity system was largely designed for a period when consumer demand was more predictable and most electricity was supplied directly through the national grid.
Today, grid sales decline during the day, but sufficient generation capacity must still be kept available to serve consumers after sunset. The system must therefore maintain coal, gas, RLNG, hydropower and other plants even though consumers may purchase fewer grid units during daylight hours.
The question that matters to consumers
The increased use of imported coal despite record hydropower shows that producing cheap electricity is not enough. The electricity must also be available at the time consumers need it.
If abundant solar and hydropower are available during the day but cannot be stored for evening use, the system must return to conventional thermal plants after sunset.
Possible responses include battery storage, pumped hydropower, better forecasting of distributed solar production, cheaper daytime electricity for industry, incentives for consumers to shift demand and sufficient flexible generation to respond to the evening increase.
Why greater data transparency matters
Publishing total demand and marginal prices is an important start, but a complete public record should also show hourly gross demand, demand remaining after distributed solar, the fuel mix, the plant setting the marginal price and the reason for operating any plant outside the normal merit order.
This would allow consumers and researchers to identify the hour in which demand rose most sharply, the higher-cost plant that entered the system and whether its operation was caused by fuel shortages, transmission restrictions, technical requirements or weak planning.
The central lesson from the financial year 2025-26 is clear. Pakistan is moving from a simple electricity-supply problem towards a challenge involving timing, flexibility and storage.
Even record hydropower generation cannot eliminate imported-fuel dependence unless low-cost daytime electricity can be shifted to the evening.
Slowing the solar transition is not the answer. Pakistan needs a grid capable of storing cheap daytime power, delivering it after sunset and using expensive imported fuels only when no lower-cost alternative is available.

Karachi’s inclusion in the latest list of the world’s least liveable cities should not surprise anyone. Karachi ranks at 170 out of 173 global cities; the cities which are least livable. For decades, the city has struggled with water shortages, damaged roads, inadequate public transport, poor sanitation, unplanned construction and weak municipal services.
The issue, however, extends far beyond international rankings or the daily inconvenience faced by residents. A city’s liveability has a direct impact on its real estate market, the actual value of its properties, rental demand, construction activity and long term investment potential.
People do not simply purchase a house, apartment or plot. They also purchase access to roads, water, sewerage, electricity, transport, schools, hospitals, security and employment. When these basic services remain unreliable, even expensive properties and modern housing projects become less secure and less sustainable investments.
The Economist Intelligence Unit’s latest Global Liveability Index places numbers against conditions Karachi’s residents experience every day. Traffic congestion, inadequate healthcare, deteriorating infrastructure, poor public services and continuing concerns about stability have all weakened the city’s overall quality of life.
From a real estate perspective, this raises several important questions. Does a high property price necessarily represent genuine value? Can a housing project be considered successful when residents must purchase water through private tankers? Is an apartment a safe investment when fire safety, parking, drainage and emergency access remain inadequate?
A widening gap has developed between property prices and the quality of urban life in Karachi. Homes, apartments and plots have become more expensive in many areas, but public infrastructure has not improved at the same pace. Buyers often pay a high price for property and then spend additional money on water, electricity backup, security, transport and private maintenance.
The latest delay affecting the K Four water supply project is a clear example of the wider problem. The project was launched to provide relief to a city facing a severe water shortage. Its first phase is now expected to be completed by the end of 2029 because of legal obstacles, weak coordination among institutions and implementation difficulties.
By the time the project is completed, Karachi’s population and water demand will have increased further. There is a real possibility that the planned capacity, considered adequate when the project was designed, may no longer be enough to meet the city’s needs.
Water shortages have a direct impact on property markets. They increase the cost of living, encourage tenants to search for alternative areas, make building maintenance more difficult and force developers to arrange expensive private infrastructure. In some neighbourhoods, property prices continue to rise on paper while the true cost of living in those properties also increases sharply.
Pakistan has developed a troubling pattern in the delivery of major infrastructure projects. A crisis is first recognised, a project is announced and work begins. The project then faces funding shortages, legal disputes, administrative disagreements and repeated reviews. By the time it is completed, the original problem has often become much larger.
Such delays are especially damaging for Karachi because it is not an ordinary city. It is Pakistan’s largest urban centre, its main port, financial capital and leading commercial hub. Failures involving Karachi’s roads, water, transport and municipal systems affect not only local residents but also industry, trade, employment and the wider national economy.
Traffic congestion raises the cost of moving people and goods. Water shortages increase operating costs for industries and housing projects. Damaged roads reduce access to commercial districts, while unreliable municipal services weaken the confidence of local and foreign investors.
These conditions affect both residential and commercial property. Areas with better roads, water, drainage and public transport generally attract stronger demand. Areas with poor infrastructure face uncertain property values, higher construction costs and greater investment risks.
A recent discussion before a parliamentary committee highlighted the continuing shortage of funding for important development projects. Lawmakers from Sindh again raised concerns about inadequate federal allocations, while officials acknowledged that financial constraints repeatedly disrupt ongoing schemes.
Whether the issue involves the K Four project, the M Six motorway or another major transport and infrastructure programme, repeated delays also create uncertainty in real estate planning. Developers, buyers and investors frequently make decisions on the assumption that promised roads, transport links or utilities will be completed on time. When deadlines are repeatedly revised, those property decisions are also affected.
Karachi’s institutional structure is another major part of the problem. Responsibility for land, construction, water, roads, sanitation, transport and building control is divided among several agencies. When authority is fragmented, accountability becomes weak.
This institutional division contributes to unplanned urban expansion, illegal construction, poor building control, weak master planning and the uncontrolled conversion of residential areas into commercial zones.
Karachi’s residents and businesses deserve better. In a city that supports a large share of Pakistan’s economy, clean water, functioning transport, safe buildings, sanitation and dependable municipal services should be treated as basic requirements rather than optional improvements.
The latest liveability ranking should not be viewed only as an international embarrassment. It is also a domestic question of accountability. Reports have been written, committees have been formed, projects have been announced and completion dates have been repeatedly revised. Yet the expected improvement in daily urban life has not followed.
Karachi does not need another diagnosis. It needs effective urban governance, a clear and enforceable master plan, consistent infrastructure investment and meaningful coordination between the institutions responsible for running the city.
Sustainable real estate growth will only be possible when improvements in property prices are matched by improvements in living standards. The true value of a city is not created only by high rise buildings, expensive plots and new developments. It is created by water, roads, transport, safety and effective urban management.
Until these basic issues are addressed, Karachi’s weak position in global liveability rankings will not be an unexpected outcome. It will remain the predictable result of decades of inadequate planning, administrative neglect and insufficient investment in essential urban infrastructure.

A fundamental feature of property disputes in Pakistan and India is that the person recorded as the legal owner in official documents is often different from the person who has physical possession of the land, house or commercial property.

One party may produce a registered sale deed, mutation entry, land ownership record, inheritance document or court order, while the other relies on prolonged possession, construction, residence, cultivation, electricity bills or testimony from local witnesses as evidence supporting their claim.

This contradiction lies at the heart of a significant number of civil cases involving title to property, recovery of possession, partition, inheritance, injunctions, sale agreements and cancellation of mutation entries.

Where Did the Idea of Fifty Years of Possession Come From?

A widespread public belief suggests that a person who remains in possession of a property for fifty years automatically becomes its legal owner. In reality, no general fifty year rule existed under the laws of British India.

Under the Limitation Act 1908, the general limitation period associated with adverse possession was twelve years. The principle was intended to address situations in which the original owner failed to approach a court for the protection of their rights for an extended period, while another person remained openly in possession of the property in direct denial of the owner’s title.

After the expiry of the prescribed period, the original owner’s legal claim could, in certain circumstances, become barred.

However, not every instance of prolonged possession amounts to adverse possession. A tenant, agricultural tenant, licensee, caretaker, relative or person residing with the permission of the owner does not become the owner merely because time has passed.

To establish adverse possession, it must be proved that the person in possession clearly rejected the title of the original owner, maintained continuous and visible possession, and that the original owner was aware of the hostile nature of that possession.

The Current Law in India

Under India’s Limitation Act 1963, the general period for filing a suit to recover private property is twelve years. This period begins when the defendant’s possession becomes adverse to the original owner.

For certain property claims brought by the government or a local authority, the limitation period is thirty years.

Section 27 of the Indian law further provides that the original owner’s right may be extinguished once the prescribed limitation period expires.

In 2019, the Supreme Court of India ruled that where all legal requirements of adverse possession have been fulfilled, the person in possession may rely on the right acquired through adverse possession not only as a defence but also as the basis of a claim to ownership.

Despite this position, Indian courts apply the doctrine strictly. The person claiming adverse possession must prove the date on which possession began, the nature and continuity of that possession, the boundaries of the property and clear hostility towards the title of the original owner.

Merely stating that a family has lived on the property for several decades, paid electricity bills or constructed buildings on it is not sufficient.

The Supreme Court of India has also strongly criticised the tendency of government institutions to acquire citizens’ land through adverse possession. The Court has observed that a welfare state should not rely on adverse possession to take over property belonging to its citizens.

Why Was Adverse Possession Abolished in Pakistan?

Following independence, Pakistan adopted the Limitation Act 1908. Under Section 28 and Article 144 of the Act, the original owner’s right could be extinguished in certain circumstances, allowing the right of an adverse possessor to become legally established.

In 1991, the Shariat Appellate Bench of the Supreme Court held that depriving an original owner of property merely because of the passage of time, while granting rights to an unlawful possessor, was inconsistent with Islamic principles.

To implement this judgment, Section 28 and Article 144 were deleted in 1995.

Following this change, prolonged unlawful possession in Pakistan, even for fifty years, does not automatically create ownership against the original owner.

However, the law of limitation has not been abolished in its entirety. Limitation periods still apply to claims based on previous possession, eviction, contracts, inheritance and various other rights.

Every dispute must therefore be examined separately according to the nature of the claim, the legal basis of possession and the relevant statutory provision.

The Difference Between a Registered Deed, Mutation and Land Ownership Record

A major misconception in Pakistan is that the entry of a person’s name in a mutation or revenue record conclusively proves ownership.

Courts have repeatedly clarified that mutation entries are primarily recorded for revenue and fiscal purposes. A mutation is not, by itself, a document of title. Nor can it validate an underlying transaction affected by forgery, fraud or lack of legal authority.

A party relying on a mutation must also prove the original transaction on which it is based, such as a sale, gift, inheritance or exchange.

Similarly, a registered document can constitute strong evidence, but registration alone cannot cure every legal defect. If the person selling the property did not possess valid title, the mere registration of the sale deed cannot automatically create lawful ownership.

Why Do Ownership and Possession Become Separated?

There are several practical reasons for the separation between legal ownership and physical possession.

After the death of an owner, heirs often fail to record the inheritance mutation. Joint land may continue to be used for several generations without formal partition. Owners may move abroad or relocate to other cities.

Tenancy and caretaker arrangements are frequently made without written agreements. General powers of attorney are sometimes misused. Registered deeds, revenue records and land maps may not correspond with one another.

In some cases, a court delivers a judgment, but the decision is never incorporated into the relevant revenue record.

Similarly, a buyer may complete the registration of the property but fail to obtain formal physical possession. Some people purchase vacant plots and do not inspect them for years, creating opportunities for fraudsters and organised land grabbers.

On the other hand, some occupants may have used land for several generations but possess incomplete documentation.

In such circumstances, one party presents the legal record while the other presents the physical reality on the ground. This conflict can keep a case pending before the courts for many years.

Government and Judicial Measures in Pakistan

Pakistan enacted the Illegal Dispossession Act 2005 to protect lawful owners and legitimate occupants from people who attempt to remove them from property through force, intimidation or fraud.

The law criminalises unlawful entry into property, illegal occupation and the dispossession of an owner or lawful occupant. Subsequent amendments have further clarified the scope of the legislation.

In Punjab, land records have been computerised through the Land Records Management Information System and the Punjab Land Records Authority.

Land record centres, biometric verification, computerised ownership records and digital mutation procedures are intended to reduce human interference, unauthorised alteration of records and fraudulent mutation entries.

Under the Punjab Urban Land Systems Enhancement project, work is also under way to connect cadastral maps with ownership records, digitally map urban and semi urban land and establish an integrated land information portal.

The objective is to clearly identify the location of every parcel of land, define its boundaries and determine who is recorded as its owner.

During 2025, Punjab also enacted new legislation concerning the protection of ownership of immovable property. The law sought to provide a faster legal process against unlawful dispossession and occupation. Further amendments were introduced in 2026.

Provincial laws have also been amended to facilitate electronic registration and computerised revenue administration.

Efforts to Correct Land Records in India

In India, the Digital India Land Records Modernization Programme is being used to computerise revenue records, integrate registration with mutation procedures, digitise cadastral maps and modernise registration offices.

The National Generic Document Registration System provides states with a shared digital platform for property registration.

In inhabited rural areas, drone surveys, mapping and property cards have been introduced under the SVAMITVA programme.

Despite these initiatives, most land records in India remain presumptive in nature. This means that the record provides strong evidence of a person’s ownership but does not necessarily constitute an absolute and legally guaranteed title issued by the state in every case.

As a result, where a conflict arises between a registered deed, revenue record and physical possession, a court decision may still be required.

Why Computerisation Alone Is Not Enough

Transferring old and disputed records into a computer system without first correcting them does not resolve the underlying conflict. In some cases, it merely gives an inaccurate record a digital form.

The real requirement is to connect the registered deed, mutation, cadastral map, physical boundaries, actual possession, mortgage, court order and inheritance information with the record of the same parcel of land.

As long as different government departments continue to maintain separate and disconnected records, one person will continue to produce a registered deed, another a mutation entry and a third evidence of physical possession.

Measures Required for a Permanent Solution

Pakistan and India must move beyond the mere registration of documents and establish a comprehensive ownership system based on individual parcels of land.

Every plot, house and agricultural parcel should be assigned a permanent and unique identification number connected with the registered deed, revenue record, cadastral map, property tax, mortgage information and pending court cases.

At the time of every sale, the registration of the deed should not be sufficient on its own. A formal document recording the transfer of physical possession should also be mandatory.

This document could include biometric verification of the buyer and seller, location tagged photographs of the property, identification of its boundaries and verification by witnesses.

Whenever an application is made for a mutation, registration, mortgage or any other change in ownership, an immediate mobile phone and email notification should be sent to the recorded owner and all joint owners.

This would make it more difficult for fraudsters to change ownership records in the absence of the actual owner.

Following a court judgment, the ownership and revenue records should be updated automatically. A successful litigant should not be required to visit revenue offices, registration offices and other departments repeatedly to secure implementation of the decision.

A compulsory system should also be introduced for the partition and mutation of jointly owned and inherited property within a prescribed period.

When inheritance mutations remain unrecorded for several generations, the rights of joint owners, purchasers and occupants become severely complicated.

Simple electronic registration should also be made available for tenancy, licence, caretaking and agricultural tenancy agreements. This would prevent possession that originally began with the owner’s permission from later being presented as ownership or adverse possession.

The real cause of property disputes is not limited to land grabbing or defective documentation. It is a fragmented system in which legal ownership, revenue records, cadastral maps and physical possession operate along separate and often conflicting paths.

The doctrine of adverse possession continues to exist in India, although strict legal requirements must be fulfilled before it can be established.

Pakistan abolished the principle under which adverse possession could extinguish the original owner’s title in 1995. Nevertheless, the practical divide between documentation and possession continues to generate disputes for millions of citizens.

A permanent solution will become possible only when the government establishes an authoritative, map linked and continuously updated record for every property, and ensures that both legal ownership and physical possession are transferred simultaneously as part of the same legally recognised transaction.

The world’s greatest buildings do not become part of history solely because of their height, scale or construction cost. Some acquire lasting importance because their design reflects a deeper understanding of faith, service, human needs and cultural identity.
Dr Mohamed Kamal Ismail was one of the architects who regarded architecture not simply as a profession but as a cultural and ethical responsibility. His contribution to the expansion of the Two Holy Mosques placed him among the most influential figures associated with modern Islamic architecture.
Born in Mit Ghamr, Egypt, in 1908, Ismail studied architecture at the Royal School of Engineering, where he reportedly graduated at the top of his class. He later travelled to France for advanced study in architecture, structural engineering and Islamic architectural traditions.
After returning to Egypt, he joined the country’s Royal Buildings Authority and was appointed its director in 1948.
His career was not limited to the Two Holy Mosques. He contributed to the design of several major public and religious buildings in Egypt, including the High Court building, the Mogamma government complex, the Telephone Authority building and Salah al-Din Mosque.
These projects demonstrated his ability to combine classical monumentality, Islamic architectural references and the functional requirements of modern public institutions.
Ismail also produced an extensive encyclopedia documenting Egypt’s historic mosques. The work went beyond recording old buildings and examined proportions, courtyards, domes, arches, ventilation, natural light and the evolution of Islamic architectural styles.
Reports suggest that this research attracted the attention of Saudi Arabia’s King Fahd bin Abdulaziz. Ismail was subsequently given a leading role in the planning and expansion of the Grand Mosque in Makkah and the Prophet’s Mosque in Madinah.
Expanding Sacred Places Without Erasing Their Identity
Expanding the Two Holy Mosques was fundamentally different from developing an ordinary commercial or government project. The challenge was not simply to add more built space. Any new construction had to remain visually, functionally and spiritually connected to structures carrying centuries of religious and architectural history.
A central feature of Ismail’s approach was to ensure that the expanded areas did not appear detached from the original mosques. New prayer halls, columns, courtyards, domes, flooring and façades were designed to form part of a unified architectural composition.
At the Grand Mosque, the work included additional prayer areas, preparation of the roof for worshippers and improvements to the surrounding spaces and circulation system.
The expansion of the Prophet’s Mosque included new entrances, additional minarets, larger prayer areas, escalators and improved access to the roof.
The projects also had to address exceptionally complex operational requirements. Millions of pilgrims had to move safely through the buildings, often in extreme temperatures and during periods of intense crowding.
Natural light, ventilation, shade, cleaning systems, emergency access and the continuous movement of worshippers therefore had to be treated as integral elements of the architecture rather than secondary engineering considerations.
Designing Around Human Comfort
Human comfort was an important element of Ismail’s architectural philosophy. He sought to provide natural light and ventilation while reducing the impact of the region’s intense heat on worshippers.
The white Greek Thassos marble used across the courtyards of the Two Holy Mosques is frequently associated with this approach. Its light colour, thermal characteristics and carefully specified thickness help keep the walking surface relatively cooler than many conventional paving materials.
An account published by Egypt’s Al Ahram reported that Ismail searched for an appropriate material after considering the effect of the hot flooring on pilgrims. He selected Greek Thassos marble and paid particular attention to its thickness and installation.
A widely circulated story claims that several years after marble had been acquired for the Grand Mosque, the same material was requested for the Prophet’s Mosque. According to the account, the remaining stock was eventually located in the warehouse of a Saudi company, where it had remained unused for about 15 years. The company owner reportedly donated it for use at the Prophet’s Mosque.
The story has been repeated in numerous biographical articles and social media posts. However, its full sequence of events has not been independently established through primary government, corporate or contractual records.
What is better supported is that Thassos marble was selected for the holy sites and that Ismail placed considerable importance on material performance and the comfort of worshippers.
Architecture Is More Than Concrete and Floor Area
The expansions provide an important lesson for the wider real estate and construction sector. The success of a major project cannot be measured only by the number of additional square metres delivered. It must also be judged by how well the development understands and protects the original purpose of the place.
Religious, historic and culturally significant properties require architects to consider collective memory, environmental conditions, human behaviour and architectural identity.
An expansion that provides more space but damages the character of a historic building may achieve its numerical target while losing much of its cultural value.
Ismail attempted to connect modern engineering with familiar elements of Islamic architecture, including courtyards, domes, columns, shade, proportion, ventilation and natural light.
Moving domes, automated umbrellas, underground facilities and large circulation systems demonstrated that historic identity and modern technology do not have to compete. When properly integrated, technology can support and strengthen architectural tradition.
Service and Professional Ethics
Several biographical accounts also state that Ismail declined substantial financial compensation for his work on the Two Holy Mosques. A widely attributed statement suggests that he did not wish to turn service to the sacred sites into a source of personal profit.
The full financial and contractual details of this account are not publicly documented. Nevertheless, his modest lifestyle, limited media presence and preference to remain outside the public spotlight are repeatedly mentioned in published profiles.
He continued to live quietly and died in 2008, leaving behind buildings and research that were more widely recognised than the architect himself.
His career offers a valuable message for contemporary real estate and construction professionals. An architect’s true legacy is not limited to drawings, project budgets or gross floor area.
It is found in the comfort, dignity, cultural continuity and lasting public value created by the design.
Through his work on the Two Holy Mosques, Dr Mohamed Kamal Ismail demonstrated how architecture could bring together engineering, heritage, faith and human service.
His legacy remains a reminder that truly great buildings are not supported by concrete and stone alone. They stand on foundations of knowledge, responsibility, sincerity and purpose.

Despite encroachments over more than 12,400 acres of Pakistan Railways land, Lahore Division has generated a record Rs 3 billion through land recovery, effective management and commercial utilisation
Encroachments on Pakistan Railways land have remained a serious threat to public assets for decades. The problem not only weakens the institution’s financial position but also obstructs infrastructure development, railway modernisation and the establishment of a safer and more efficient transport system.
Against this backdrop, the National Assembly Standing Committee on Railways has taken a welcome step by seeking a comprehensive report on encroachments across the railway network.
Although the committee also reviewed recent railway accidents, the restructuring plan and progress on the Main Line One project, the occupation of railway land requires sustained attention rather than occasional parliamentary discussions and short-lived anti-encroachment drives.
According to media reports, more than 12,400 acres of Pakistan Railways land have been illegally occupied across the country, with Punjab and Sindh accounting for the largest share.
The scale of the problem reflects more than administrative weakness. It is the outcome of decades of poor enforcement, inadequate monitoring, institutional neglect and, in some cases, the alleged patronage of politically connected or influential groups.
Railway land is among the institution’s most valuable assets. A significant portion of it is located in major urban centres, commercial districts, industrial areas and along important transportation corridors.
With transparent planning and effective commercial management, these properties could provide Pakistan Railways with a substantial and sustainable source of non-fare revenue.
The consequences of encroachment extend far beyond the loss of public land. Illegal structures create difficulties in maintaining railway tracks, increase safety risks, obstruct the expansion of rail services and complicate the implementation of major infrastructure projects.
The issue becomes even more critical in the context of projects such as Main Line One and the proposed freight corridor between Pipri and Karachi. These projects require secure rights of way, clearly demarcated boundaries and effective legal protection of railway property.
Any delay in recovering occupied land is likely to increase project costs, create legal complications and make implementation more difficult. Land management must therefore be treated as a central component of railway reform rather than a secondary administrative matter.
The performance of Pakistan Railways’ Lahore Division demonstrates that encroached land can be recovered and transformed into a productive source of revenue when administrative commitment, continuous enforcement and effective land management are combined.
During the financial year 2025 26, Lahore Division generated a record Rs 3 billion through the recovery of government land, action against illegal occupants and improved commercial management of railway property.
This was Rs 1.7 billion higher than the approximately Rs1.3 billion earned during the previous financial year, making it one of the most significant financial achievements in the division’s history.
According to Divisional Superintendent Lahore Inamullah, railway land worth nearly Rs 7 billion was recovered from illegal occupation in Badami Bagh and other parts of Lahore Division.
The recovered properties included 51.1 acres of commercial land, 24 marlas of residential property and nine acres of agricultural land.
The division also moved beyond simply recovering the land. Of the reclaimed property, 34 kanals were leased again, generating additional revenue for Pakistan Railways.
This approach should be adopted across the country through a transparent, legally sound and commercially viable land management policy.
The Lahore Division’s experience reinforces the argument that the financial recovery of Pakistan Railways cannot depend solely on higher passenger fares, government subsidies or an increase in the number of trains.
The institution must generate consistent revenue from its land, commercial properties, railway stations, warehouses, parking facilities and other assets.
Pakistan Railways has also completed the geo-referencing of its land boundaries and integrated the information into a centralised digital database with real-time monitoring capabilities.
This is an important development that could improve transparency, identify new encroachments at an early stage and reduce disputes concerning ownership and boundaries.
Technology, however, cannot resolve the problem on its own. Digital maps and centralised records will only be effective when supported by timely legal action, coordination among the railway administration, district authorities and railway police, and the swift pursuit of cases before the courts.
There must also be the political will to take action against illegal occupants without discrimination.
At the same time, anti-encroachment operations must remain lawful, transparent and humane. Economically vulnerable families that have lived on railway land for long periods may require proper surveys and, where justified, rehabilitation measures.
However, there can be no justification for allowing organised land mafias, commercial occupants or influential groups to retain control over valuable public property
Lahore Division has also initiated environmentally friendly measures to protect and improve recovered railway land. In collaboration with the Parks and Horticulture Authority, green belts are being developed along both sides of the railway track from Shahdara to Raiwind.
Practical work on the initiative has already begun around Kot Lakhpat Railway Station. Such projects can help prevent fresh encroachments while improving the urban environment surrounding railway infrastructure
The directions issued by the National Assembly Standing Committee should not be reduced to a routine data collection exercise or another official report.
The findings should form the basis of a comprehensive action plan containing province-wise and division-wise targets, legal timelines, recovery priorities and clearly defined proposals for the future use of reclaimed land.
Lahore Division’s performance can serve as a pilot model for evaluating railway divisions across the country. Divisions and officials that successfully recover land and generate transparent revenue should be recognised, while responsibility must be fixed where poor performance, record manipulation or fresh encroachments are identified.
Protecting railway land is ultimately about safeguarding public property, restoring institutional credibility and creating the physical and financial space required for a modern, safe and commercially sustainable railway system.
Lahore Division has shown that government land can not only be recovered from illegal occupation but also transformed into a source of billions of rupees in revenue.
The challenge now is to turn this divisional success into a nationwide policy. Unless the state demonstrates a sustained commitment to recovering, protecting and transparently utilising these strategic assets, the broader agenda of financial and administrative reform within Pakistan Railways will remain incomplete.

The continued expansion of Israeli settlements in the occupied Palestinian territories is no longer merely a political or diplomatic issue. It has also become a core real estate dispute linked to land, ownership, demographic change and the future borders of a possible state. The recent debate at the United Nations Security Council once again made clear that the expansion of new settlements, housing units and settler outposts in the West Bank is gradually weakening the prospects of a negotiated two state solution.
The report of the UN Secretary General reiterated the established position that Israeli settlements built in the occupied territories since 1967 have no legal validity under international law. Yet the reality on the ground is that these settlements continue to expand. Every new housing unit, road, outpost and construction project further restricts the geographical continuity of Palestinian land.
The E1 corridor project is particularly sensitive. If construction activity moves forward in this area, the territorial link within the West Bank could be severely affected. A connected, viable and administratively unified Palestinian state would become even more difficult to imagine. This is why E1 is not being viewed merely as a construction or development project, but as a move that could alter the future political map.
Pakistan also highlighted this danger during the Security Council debate. Pakistan’s Permanent Representative to the United Nations, Ambassador Asim Iftikhar Ahmad, referred to the approval or advancement of 4,750 housing units and the Israeli cabinet’s approval of 34 new settlements, warning that the West Bank is facing one of the most intense waves of settlement expansion in recent history. This concern was not limited to Pakistan; several other countries also described settlement expansion as a serious threat to the peace process.
The real issue is that changes taking place on the ground could make any future negotiations meaningless. When settler communities continue to expand in occupied areas, Palestinian access to land is restricted, homes are demolished, displacement increases and geographical continuity is broken, the idea of a two state solution risks becoming limited to diplomatic statements.
The situation in Gaza makes this crisis even more severe. Hunger, water shortages, the collapse of the healthcare system and large scale displacement have pushed the humanitarian tragedy to a dangerous level. International humanitarian law requires the protection of civilians and the unhindered delivery of aid, but both requirements appear to be repeatedly ignored in practice.
UN Secretary General Antonio Guterres has also warned that the unchecked spread of settlements is creating the worst displacement crisis in the West Bank since 1967. The rise in settler outposts is fueling violence, reducing Palestinian access to their own lands and further weakening the conditions necessary for peace.
The real question before the Security Council is not what international law says. There is already broad international consensus on that point. The real question is who will enforce that law. If practical steps are not taken to halt illegal settlement activity, permanent changes may take place on occupied Palestinian land that will be extremely difficult to reverse later.
From a real estate perspective, this conflict is about control of land, residential planning, property rights and demographic change. From a political perspective, these same construction projects are shaping the future borders of a state. That is the real gravity of the issue.
The Security Council must now move beyond statements of concern. If the international community genuinely wants to preserve the two state solution, it must show effective political will against illegal construction, settlement expansion and forced displacement on occupied land. Otherwise, the possibility of a Palestinian state will continue to shrink on the ground, and the credibility of the international system will weaken along with it.

Lahore | Muhammad Faisal Salahria ReNews Lahore
Pakistan’s cement industry is closing fiscal year 2025 26 on a relatively stronger footing, but the pace of growth remains limited. Total cement dispatches during the year are expected to cross 50 million tonnes, around 7 percent higher than the previous fiscal year.
Industry estimates suggest that the improvement is being driven mainly by domestic demand. Local dispatches are expected to rise by nearly 9 percent, while exports may decline by around 3 percent. Lower inflation, easing interest rates and improving business confidence have helped revive private construction activity to some extent.
However, the cement sector continues to face a major structural challenge. Production capacity expanded rapidly in recent years, but consumption did not grow at the same pace. Capacity utilisation is expected to improve from 56 percent last year to around 59 percent this year, still below the 65 percent level generally considered healthy for the industry.
During the peak of construction activity linked to the China Pakistan Economic Corridor and the housing incentives under the Naya Pakistan Housing Programme, cement manufacturers expanded their production lines aggressively. But economic instability, political uncertainty and repeated stabilisation programmes slowed construction activity before the new capacity could be fully absorbed.
Exports are also no longer providing the same level of support. Rising regional competition, freight costs and less favourable economic conditions have affected overseas dispatches, particularly for cement producers in southern Pakistan that depend on sea routes for exports.
Analysts believe the renewed focus on the domestic market is commercially more attractive for cement manufacturers, as local sales usually offer better pricing power and lower logistics costs. At the same time, it means the industry is now more dependent on Pakistan’s own construction cycle, public development spending and housing activity.
In the fiscal year 2026- 27 budget, the government has announced several tax measures aimed at supporting construction and real estate activity. A subsidised housing finance scheme is also expected to encourage home ownership. Still, weak housing affordability, limited household income growth, tax pressures and constrained public development spending remain key obstacles.
Industry observers say local demand is unlikely to grow fast enough in the near term to absorb Pakistan’s surplus cement capacity. However, major cement companies have focused in recent years on strengthening balance sheets, reducing production costs and diversifying export markets where possible.
For the sector, the more important requirement now may not be another temporary construction boom, but a stable economy that can generate steady domestic demand every year. Such a path could provide a stronger and more sustainable base for the industry, even if surplus capacity continues to cast a shadow over the market for some time.
The recovery in cement dispatches is encouraging, but it does not yet signal a full construction boom. The key question is whether domestic construction demand can remain steady. Lower interest rates, housing finance and budget incentives may support gradual improvement, but surplus production capacity is likely to remain a challenge in the near future